Malware is any type of computer software harmful to computers and networks. The amount of malware is increasing every year and poses as a serious global security threat. Signature-based detection is the most broadly used commercial antivirus method, however, it fails to detect new and previously unseen malware. Supervised machine-learning models have been proposed in order to solve this issue, but the usefulness of supervised learning is far to be perfect because it requires a significant amount of malicious code and benign software to be identified and labelled in beforehand. Tn this paper, we propose a new method that adopts a collective learning approach to detect unknown malware. Collective classification is a type of semi-supervised learning that presents an interesting method for optimising the classification of partially-labelled data. Tn this way, we propose here, for the first time, collective classification algorithms to build different machine-learning classifiers using a set of labelled (as malware and legitimate software) and unlabelled instances. We perform an empirical validation demonstrating that the labelling efforts are lower than when supervised learning is used, while maintaining high accuracy rates.
INTRODUCTION
Commercial anti-malware solutions are based on sig nature databases for the detection of known malicious executables (Morley, 200 I) . However, there are sev eral problems that make the signature-based methods less than completely reliable: first they cannot cope with code obfuscations and second cannot detect pre viously unseen malware. In this paper, we are going to focus on the second problem: detecting previously unseen malware. Nevertheless, machine-learning classifiers require a high number of labelled executables for each of the classes (i.e., malware and benign). It is quite difficult to obtain this amount of labelled data for a real-world problem such as the malicious code analysis. To gen erate these data, a time-consuming process of analysis is mandatory and, in the process, some malicious exe cutables can avoid detection. Within the full scope of machine-learning, several approaches have been pro posed to deal with this issue. Semi-supervised learn ing is a type of machine-learning technique that is specially useful when a limited amount of labelled data exists for each class (Chapelle et aI., 2006) .
In particular, collective classification (Neville and Jensen, 2003) is an approach that uses the relational 1 Boosting is a machine-learning technique that builds a strong classifier composed of a high number of weak clas sifiers (Schapire, 2003) . (bl,b2,b3, ... ,bn-l,bn) where n is the length of the byte n-gram g. Therefore, a program P is composed of byte n-grams such as P = (gl ,g2, ... ,g£_ 1 ,g£) where {; is the total number of possible n-grams of a fixed length n.
We use 'term frequency -inverse document fre quency' (t{ -idf) (McGill and Salton, 1983) to ob tain the weight of each byte n-gram, whereas the weight of the ith n-gram in the fh executable, denoted by weight(i,j), is defined by: weight(i,j) = tfi.J· idfi where the term frequency tfi.J (McGill and Salton, 1983 ) is defined as: tfi.! = '" m ij where mi .
J is the . Lk m k.i .. number of times the n-gram ti , J appears in an exe cutable e, and Lkmk, J is the total number of n-grams in the executable e.
On the other hand, the inverse document fre quency idfi is defined as:
�L, where I 1: I is the total number of executables and 11: : ti E el is the number of executables containing the n-gram ti.
Finally , we can obtain a vector 17 com posed of byte n-grams frequencies,
where gi is the byte n-gram and weighti is the value oftf -idf for that particular n-gram.
COL LECTIVE CL ASSIFICATION
Collective classification is a combinatorial optimiza tion problem, in which we are given a set of doc 
EXPERIME NTAL RESULTS
The research question we seek to answer through this empirical validation is the following one: What is the minimum number of labelled instances required to as sure a suitable performance using collective classi fication? The results of our collective-classification-based malware detection method. Collective Forest was the classifier with the highest accuracy, TPR and AUC, and the lowest value of FPR. Our results outline that, obviously, the higher the number of labelled executables are in the dataset the better results are achieved.
we split the dataset into different percentages of training and tested instances. In other words, we changed the number of labelled instances from 10% to 90% to measure the effect of the num ber of labelled instances on the final performance of collective classification in detecting unknown malware. In particular, we used the collective classification implementations provided by the Semi-Supervised Learning and Collective Clas sification package for the well-known machine learning tool WEKA (Garner, 1995) . All the clas sifiers were tested with their default parameters.
Testing the Models.
To test the approach, we measured the True Positive Ratio (TPR), i.e., the number of malware instances correctly detected divided by the total number of malware files: Figure lea) shows the ac curacy results of our proposed method. As one may think in beforehand, the higher the number of train ing instances the higher the accuracy of the different models. In particular, the best overall results were ob tained by Collective Forest, achieving results higher than 90% for every possible configuration and higher than 95% when half of the instances were used for training. On the other hand, Collective 18K obtained the lowest accuracy results, achieving an accuracy higher than 80% only when more than the 50% of the instances were employed. Figure I (b) shows the ob tained results in terms of correctly classified malware executables. Collective Forest was also the best, de tecting more than the 90% of the malware executables for every tested configuration. Figure 1 (c) shows the FPR results. Every classifier obtained results lower than the 10%. Tn particular, the lowest FPR was of 2%, achieved by Collective Forest using the 90% of the instances for training. However, in order to guar antee results of FPR lower than 5%, Collective Forest only needs to be trained with a minimum of 20% of the dataset. Finally, regarding AUC (shown in Fig   ure 1 (d) ), Collective Forest was the best with results higher than 97% for every configuration.
DISCUSSION
The obtained results validate our initial hypothesis that building an unknown malware detector based on collective classification is feasible. The classifiers achieved high performance in classifying unknown malware, improving our previous results using LLGC (Santos et aI., 2011) , which achieved a 86% of ac curacy in its best configuration. Therefore, we be lieve that our results will have a strong impact in the area of unknown malware detection, which usually re lies on supervised machine learning (Schultz et aI., 2001; Kolter and Maloof, 2004) . Training the model through supervised machine-learning algorithms can be a problem itself because supervised learning re quires each instance in the dataset to be properly la belled. This demands a large amount of time and resources. We have dealt with this problem by us ing a collective approach that only needs a certain amount of data to be labelled. In this way, we tried to find among our results the number of labelled mal ware that is needed to assure a certain performance in unknown malware detection. In particular, we found out that if we label the 10% of the the total corpus, our method can achieve an accuracy and a F-measure greater than 90%. (Liu and Motoda, 2008) .
Future work will be oriented on three main di rections. First, we will extend our study of collec tive learning by applying more algorithms to this is sue. Second, we will use different features for train ing these kind of models. Third, we will face packed executables with a hybrid dynamic-static approach.
